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Resumen: Se examina la sustentabilidad del déficit de cuenta co-
rriente en México antes de la crisis de fines de 1994. El 
artículo muestra que existían señales de que la economía 
no estaba satisfaciendo su restricción presupuestaria in-
tertemporal mucho antes de que la crisis se presentara. 
La metodología usada sigue la de Wickens-Uctum, 
modificada para incluir el caso de posibles interven-
ciones. 
Abstract: This paper examines the sustainability of the Mexican 
current account deficit prior to the December 1994 
crisis. It tests whether or not the Mexican economy was 
satisfying its intertemporal budget constraint, and finds 
that signals of possible trouble without a change in 
policies were present long before the crisis. The tests 
used are based on the Wickens-Uctum criterion for the 
sustainability of current account deficits, extended to 
include the case of possible interventions. 
1. Introduction 
The Mexican economic crisis that started at the end of 1994 was not a 
surprise to many observers. As it is recounted in Urzua (1996a), and as 
opposed to the Mexican debt crisis that erupted in August 1982, this time 
there was a good number of economists that warned about an impending 
financial collapse, some as far back as in 1992. 
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Most of the observers that foretold the crisis used as their main 
argument the long-run unsustainability of the Mexican current account 
deficits. Although the claim was never rigorously substantiated, it looked 
plausible given the secular real appreciation of the Mexican currency 
(the peso) since the late eighties, and the accompanying sizable current 
account deficits. Along those lines, Dornbusch and Werner (1994) wrote 
what is perhaps the most widely known foretelling paper (see Urzua, 
1996b, for a review of other possible reasons for the crisis). 
The goal of this paper is to substantiate that claim by providing 
statistical evidence that signals of the unsustainability of the current 
account deficits were present long before the beginning of the financial 
collapse. 
The next section offers a brief overview of the performance of the 
Mexican economy prior to the crisis, paying mostly attention to the 
variables relevant for the paper. Section 3, on the other hand, reviews 
the theory to be used to test for the sustainability of current account 
deficits. It is based on the work of Wickens and Uctum (1993), after 
allowing for the possibility of deterministic interventions in the relevant 
time series. The theoretical results are then used in Section 4 to test for 
the sustainability of the deficits prior to the crisis. Finally, Section 5 
draws some concluding remarks. 
2. The Mexican Economy before the Crisis 
The economic reforms undertaken by the Mexican government from the 
late eighties to the early nineties were hailed literally around the world, 
for a while. The reforms, made specially by the Salinas administration 
(1988-1994), ranged from a drastic trade liberalization (accomplished in 
two stages), to a sweeping privatization process, to even a free trade 
agreement with the United States and Canada (NAFTA). 
Of course, we will not attempt to make here an objective appraisal 
of those reforms, such a task would require a lengthy book. Instead, this 
brief section will focus on a very narrow subject: the main determinants 
of the Mexican current account deficits prior to the crisis. Here, we will 
just try to identify, for later use, the main factors that could lie behind 
the path followed by the deficits from 1980 to 1994, as depicted in 
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The large current account deficits that the Mexican economy en-
dured during the early eighties are explained by the very high real GDP 
growth rates attained then, and an overvalued exchange rate. Already by 
1982, those large deficits, together with a substantial increase in the 
world interest rates and a drop in oil prices, put the economy in a 
precarious financial situation. Thus, in August of that year, Mexico had 
to announce that it was unable to meet its foreign obligations. This 
event initiated what came to be known as the World Debt Crisis. 
Figure 1 
Mexico's Current Account Deficit, 1980-1994 
(% of GDP) 
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 
Source: Banco de Mexico andiNEGi 
For the next two years, the Mexican economy was able to obtain 
current account surpluses, after a sharp devaluation and a drop of real 
GDP of more than 4% in 1983. In 1985, though, the surpluses had almost 
vanished as the economy gained some speed, and as the government 
suddenly accelerated the trade liberalization process (60% of the con-
trolled good categories were removed from import licensing). 
During 1986, the Mexican economy suffered a new recession, due 
mainly to a sharp drop in oil prices and the still present heavy burden of 
its external debt. These two external factors, coupled with bad domestic 
policies on the monetary and fiscal sides, sent subsequently the econ-
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By the end of 1987, the annual inflation rate was already greater 
than 150%. To control it, the government launched a somewhat hetero-
dox plan that involved income policies, the reduction of the fiscal 
deficit, a sharp devaluation, and further trade liberalization. The plan 
came to be known familiarly as the Pacto, and it was a success: Infla-
tion was lowered down without a recession, and the economy started to 
grow in the subsequent years (with the accompanying, and ever increas-
ing, current account deficits). Another favorable development was the 
conclusion, in March 1990, of a debt and debt-service reduction scheme 
following the lines of the Brady Plan. 
For our purposes, it is important to point out that from the begin-
ning of the (first) Pacto until the eruption of the new crisis in December 
1994, the exchange rate was tacitly used as a nominal anchor by the 
authorities. This was obviously true during an ephemeral period of a 
fixed exchange rate regime in 1988. But it was also true during the next 
type of regime: Although the government adopted, until January 1991, 
an official crawling peg, the daily devaluations were too small relative 
to the difference between the Mexican and us inflation rates. Finally, the 
claim continued to be true from 1991 to 1994, when an exchange rate band 
regime was adopted. Once again, the crawling peg, used as a center for 
the band, was too modest. 
In November 1991, the government decided to adjust sharply its 
tariffs. But, afraid of the inflationary and political repercussions, it 
decided to halve the crawling peg of the peso and to lower the value 
added tax rates. The reduction of the daily devaluations was a mistake.
1 
From 1991 to 1992, the annual current account deficit jumped from 
5.2% to 7.5% of GDP, a percentage that was already larger than the one at 
the end of 1981 Gust eight months before the beginning of the debt 
crisis). The authorities went back to the original peg in November 1992, 
but the change was clearly insufficient: even though in 1993 the econ-
omy grew a meager 0.6%, the current account deficit was only lowered 
to 6.6% of GDP. 
We believe that it was in November 1992 when the authorities lost 
their last clear opportunity to attack the problem by devaluing the peso 
(coupled with an acommodating monetary policy). After that date, they 
were bound to let the currency to continue its appreciation for two 
1 As well as the lowering of the tax rate (see Urzua 1996c). AN EVENTUAL COLLAPSE  171 
reasons: First, NAFTA was going to be signed by the end of that year, and 
an aggressive exchange rate policy would not have been taken lightly 
by Mexico's new trade partners. And, second, there was going to be a 
presidential election in August 1994, which required both an economy 
growing strongly and the avoidance at all costs of a sharp devaluation. 
But the picture became even gloomier in 1994: On January 1, the 
same day when NAFTA came into effect, there was an indian armed 
uprising in the South of Mexico, and in March the main presidential 
candidate was murdered apparently by members of his own party. Natu-
rally, a speculative attack against the peso developed afterwards, which 
forced the authorities to open a line of credit with the us. Treasury, and 
to offer to investors dollar-indexed bonds (of which 28 billion dollars 
were outstanding at the beginning of the crisis!). 
Although a full accounting of what happened in 1994 makes for a 
fascinating reading, it is not needed here. We will show below that the 
unsustainabilty of the current account deficit was evident in 1992, and, 
hence, that the political events that took place in 1994 only exacerbated 
the problem. But in order to show that, it does not suffice to estimate 
how overvalued was the currencysly overvaluated,
2 for such a discus-
sion neglects other important factors (such as the income effect on the 
current account deficit). Instead, what it is needed is a model to derive a 
test for the sustainability of the current account deficits. To this we turn 
next. 
3. The Sustainability of a Nation's Current Account Deficit 
The budgetary position of an open economy vis a vis the rest of the world 
is determined by the evolving state of its current account. Thus, it is 
natural to ask for conditions under which a given path of current account 
deficits (or surpluses, for that matter) is sustainable in the long-run. In 
this section we review a test developed precisely for that purpose by 
Wickens and Uctum (1993). We also provide a simple extension to it that 
seems better suited for the case of the Mexican economy. 
2 Although some authors continue to believe so (see, for instance, Gil-Diaz and 
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When an economy has a deficit at some point, it means that there is 
a negative change in the financial claims of that nation against the rest 
of the world. This fact is stated by the following identity: 
a, =
 Af, O) 
where a is the current account deficit during period t, expressed in 
domestic currency and as a proportion of nominal GDP, and ft is the net 
foreign indebtedness of the economy at t, once again expressed in 
domestic currency and deflated by nominal GDP.
3 
The (ex-post) real interest rate on/f adjusted for real output growth 





where the three terms on the right-hand side are, respectively, the domes-
tic nominal rate of return, the inflation rate (measured by the rate of 
growth of the GDP deflator), and the real GDP growth rate. 
Now assume that both the Uncovered Interest Parity Condition, UIPC 
and the rational expectations hypothesis hold. The suitability of the 
former assumption for the Mexican case will be discussed later, but it 
should be noted that the assumption is made here only for pragmatic 
reasons: If UIPC holds, then we do not have to make an explicit distinc-
tion between the assets held domestically or by foreigners.
4 This is very 
convenient in the case of Mexico, given the lack of reliable disaggregat-
ed information. 
Using equation (2) and the last two assumptions, (1) can be reex-
pressed in terms of the primary current account deficit (the current 
account net of interest payments and interest receipts), cf, as: 
3 The use of that deflator, something quite common in models for developing 
economies, allows us to dispose of nonstationarity effects due to inflation or real GDP 
growth. 
4 Naturally, the UIPC assumption is not required for the model. If UIPC does not hold 
because of, say, political risk, then one just needs to add to the primary current account 
deficit, defined in equation (3) below, the increase in interest payments that the nation 
has to incur due to that risk. See Wickens and Uctum, 1993, p. 426, for a general 
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where the new variable is also expressed as a proportion of GDP. The 
first-order difference equation given in (3) will play the main role in 
deriving below the conditions for sustainability. But in order to state 
those conditions in a reasonably simple way, it is necessary to further 
assume that such difference equation is linear. That is, the adjusted real 
interest rate will be taken to be equal to a constant r. 
For the purposes of this paper, the resulting linear difference equa-
tion is uninteresting when r < 0, for then a nation would never be at risk 
of becoming insolvent. This is not necessarily so, however, in the case 
of r>0. Denoting by q the discount factor 1/(1 +r), and using the 
symbol Ef for expectations given the information available up to time t, 
one can solve forward equation (3) to obtain the solution for that unsta-
ble case: 
ft = fEtft+n-Ztf-
lEtct + H_. (4) 
¡ = 0 
For a country to be solvent at time t, it has to be the case that its net 
indebtdness/, will have to be matched by the limit, as n goes to infinite, 
of the second term appearing on the right-hand side of equation (4), a 
sum that sooner or later will have to become positive by generating 
surpluses in the primary current account. Thus, the issue of the sustaina-
bility of the current account deficit boils down to assuring that the 
following transversality condition holds: 
It should be now remarked that a condition similar to (5) appears in 
lim 9»£f =0 (5)  i t
Jt + n
 v ' 
n -> oo 
the literature on the sustainability of government deficits (see, e. g., 
Trehan and Walsh, 1988, and references therein). Note that if one were 
to follow at this point that literature, the problem at hand could be 
approached by, first, rearranging and taking limits in (4) to obtain 
n - 1 
lim q
nEJ^ =ft + lim Y 9»-
i£fc,i . (6) 
^ ^
 1 I -r tl I ^ ^ •* t t + n — I 
Next, by assuming that c( is exogenous (and not Granger-caused by 
f). And, finally, by positing a particular linear time series process for 174 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
ct and finding the conditions for which the right-hand side of (6) goes 
to zero. 
It is to Wickens and Uctum's (1993) credit to have noted, however, 
that the assumption of the exogeneity of c( is not necessary. This is an 
important point, for that assumption clearly goes against economic in-
tuition: It is quite likely that both the level of net indebtedness and the 
interest payments on the debt will affect, through wealth and income 
effects, the state of the current account. 
As an alternative to the typical procedure used in the literature, 
Wickens and Uctum make endogenous the primary current account 
deficit. They carefully posit a simple behavioral equation that allows 
them to obtain, after adding equation (3), a manageable two-dimensional 
linear stochastic system. Their equation is: 
Act = T] + aft_l + ^ctl + et (7) 
where e( is a random variable that captures the additional effects of 
relevant omitted variables (say, the real exchange rate). 
The error term can be stationary or nonstationary,
5 but note that it is 
implicitly assumed by Wickens and Uctum that the stochastic process 
followed by e( is both linear and purely nondeterministic.
6 As in their 
paper, the first of these last two assumptions will continue to be made 
here, simply because it seems unlikely to be able to relax it in any 
operational way.
7 
The assumption of not having a deterministic component can be 
easily relaxed, however, by explicitly incorporating a process that 
allows for interventions of the type pioneered by Box and Tiao (1975). 
That is, instead of (7), the behavioral equation for the primary current 
account deficit to be considered here will be stated as 
5 In fact, Wickens and Uctum are able to derive their results without any restriction 
on the order of integration of ef 
6 Since in their proofs they have to make use of Wold's representation, which is 
only valid when those two conditions are present. See, e.g., Hannan and Deistler, 1988, 
p. 21. 
7 Although, of course, the stochastic process followed by the error term may very 
well be nonlinear in reality. For instance, as noted in section 2, the exchange rate was 
allowed to float inside a band prior to the crisis. As Engel and Hakkio (1994) have 
suggested, for such a regime the nominal (and hence the real) exchange rate could be 
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Act = Ti+g(8,a>,$<) + a/;_1+pci_1+<?, (8) 
where: (i) the dynamic model for the deterministic variables is given by 
7=1
 J J J 
where L is the lag operator; (ii) for each j, co.(L) has roots outside, and 
8.(L) outside or on, the unit circle; and (Hi) the components of the vector 
ofexogenous variables ^ are dummy variables taking a value of 1 during 
the periods when an intervention is known to have occurred (note that all 
interventions are prior to t). The addition of possible deterministic 
interventions will allow us to circumvent, albeit artificially, the problem 
of accounting for changes in policies that could have influenced the 
evolution of the Mexican current account deficit. 
Using now equations (3), (8) and (9), we can state the implied 
stochastic dynamic system that drives c( and/( as: 
"1 -1" 
0 1 
This system can be recasted in a vector autoregresive form as which 
can be in turn rewritten as 
Ac>. 
A*f = ^ + eacf_, + «f (10) 
after defining xf = (ft, c)', ut = {ef, e)', 
r + a 1 + p 
a p 
We can now solve (10) backwards, starting at period t + n, to obtain 
^+B = (I + 0)"*/ + Sa + 0)












LTl + g(ò, co, <yj + 
\r + a 1 + p" 
P  a 
t-1  + 
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This equation can be used to finally find, after defining y= (1, 0)', 
an expression for the variables involved in the transversality condition (5): 
<?" Etft+„ = Y Vd + &T xt + x q" (I + Q)'' + „ _, 
i = 0 
+ J4q\l + ®)
iE!ut + nJ (11) 
i = 0 
Thus, the question of the sustainability of current account deficits 
can be answered by finding the conditions for which the right-hand side 
of (11) goes to zero as n goes to infinite. The answer to that question is 
the Wickens-Uctum (sufficient) condition for sustainability: If \ 
(i = 1, 2) denotes a characteristic root of the matrix I + 0, then it has to 
satisfy IX,.I< l/q=\+r. 
The reason is that under such a condition the three terms inside the 
bracket in equation (11) tend to zero.
8 This is clear for the first term, 
since the n-th power of matrix q{\ + 0) tends to a matrix of zeros 
because (qk)
n goes to zero. A more difficult problem is to show that the 
third term also goes to zero, but this has been proved by Wickens and 
Uctum (1993). Finally, it becomes clear that the second term also goes 
to zero after rewriting it as: 
"]£ <t (I + ©)'' ]it + „ _,. = q" (I + 0)" X (I + ®T
j \l, +,. 
i = 0 ./ = i 
But, what if after estimating (8) one cannot reject the hypothesis of 
a = 0 (i.e., strong exogeneity of c)? In that case, as discussed earlier, (6) 
becomes the key equation. Under the assumption of c being integrated 
of order zero or one, Wickens and Uctum (1993) show that the sustaina-
bility issue boils down to testing whether or not the current account 
deficit, a, is not integrated. Once again, the claim can be trivially extend-
ed to the case when the series is perturbed by exogenous interventions. 
8 As noted in the text, the Wickens-Uctum condition is sufficient, but not necessary, 
for sustainability. This is so because there could be some extraneous relationship between 
the three terms in (11) that could make the whole expression go to zero in the limit, even 
if they don't go to zero individually. But that possibility seems so unlikely to really worry 
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4. Tests for the Mexican Economy 
In this section we use the criteria mentioned above to determine whether 
or not the current account deficits of the Mexican economy were sustain-
able in the long-run without a change in policies. The sample to be used 
for that end covers the 1983:1-1994:111 period; that is, the pre-crisis 
period during which the economy was liberalized. Quarterly observa-
tions for the trade balance and net transfers (the sum of which constitutes 
the primary current account deficit) were readily available. On the other 
hand, given the lack of disaggregated data, an estimate for net foreign 
indebtedness had to be constructed by cumulating the current account 
deficits starting in 1970.
9 Both series were annualized. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the corresponding graphs of c and/, obtain-
ed after taking the ratio of those variables and nominal GDP. We were 
unable to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in both cases (c and f), 
Figure 2 
Balance of Trade, 1980:1-1994:111 
(% of GDP) 
3% i 
9 The source for the balance of trade and current account figures, together with the 
end-of-period exchange rate to transform them from dollars to pesos, was Banco de 
México. The quarterly figures for nominal GDP were taken from INEGI. 178 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 3 
Net Foreign Indebtedness, 1980:1-1994:111 
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using both a Dickey-Fuller test, and a test due to Perron (1989) that 
allows for a structural break (a dummy and a time break). In order to 
avoid the well-known problem of "data-mining" while identifying the 
break point, which would be then data dependent (see Christiano, 1992), 
the break point was taken to be 1988:1, the first quarterly observation 
after the Pacto (see section 2). 
As the next step, equation (8) was estimated in several ways (in all 
cases the errors exhibited autocorrelation of order at least 1): First, it 
was estimated without introducing any intervention. Second, it was 
estimated allowing for the same interventions as in the last paragraph. 
Finally, it was also estimated by adding an intervention (dummy) for the 
period 1983-1986. In all the cases the hypothesis of oc = 0 (i.e., strong 
exogeneity of c) was safely rejected. For instance, the resulting regres-
sion with no interventions was (after adding an AR(1) term): 
Ac, = -0.0008- 0.0023/,_, - 0.0898c;_, +et 
(0.0111) (0.0370) (0.1034) 
where the numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors. AN EVENTUAL COLLAPSE 179 
Thus, the primary current account deficit is strongly exogenous in 
the case of the Mexican economy. Consequently, the issue of the sus-
tainability of the current account deficit can be answered by testing 
whether or not the deficit a is non-integrated. For that end, both the 
Said-Dickey and the Perron tests were used to check for a unit root in 
that series. In both cases it was found that the series exhibited a unit 
root, and hence that the deficit was unsustainable in the long-run with-
out a change in policies. 
But a question remains: When did the series start to show unsustaina-
bility? To answer this question we repeated all the steps described above 
but reducing the end date quarter after quarter. Once again, it was found 
that c continued to be strongly exogenous in all cases. However, the 
integration property of a disappeared when the sample had as an end 
date 1992:11 or earlier. For instance, in the case of a Said-Dickey test, 
the i-value that was found by shortening the period one quarter at a 
time, with the first end period being 1994:111 and the last 1992:11, were: 
-1.16, -1.2, -1.5, -1.4, -1.5, -1.3, -1.5, -1.6, -2.3, -2.6, and -3.4. 
5. Conclusion 
As this paper has argued, a determinant factor of the Mexican economic 
crisis in 1994 was the series of increasingly large current account deficits 
that the economy endured for half a decade. They were so large and 
persistent that, as far back as mid-1992, they became unsustainable in the 
long-run barred a sharp change in economic policies. 
Naturally, the crisis was also exacerbated by many other factors, 
such as the fragility of the financial sector (see Calvo and Mendoza, 
1995), and the sclerosis of the political regime that has ruled Mexico for 
many decades. As opposed to the unsustainability issue, which has been 
temporarily solved by a sharp devaluation, these and other issues conti-
nued to play a role in the unsatisfactory stabilization process undertook 
during the 1995-1996 period. But that makes for another story. 180 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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